[Tails-dev] tails_htp: exit node can fingerprint Tails users until exit node is changed
intrigeri at boum.org
Sun Aug 5 13:13:00 CEST 2012
adrelanos wrote (23 Jul 2012 01:36:26 GMT) :
> Because Tails doesn't use stream isolation and uses tails_htp over
> Tor, the exit node can see "Hello, this is a Tails user!". (Who else
> uses tails_htp over Tor.) The problem persists until the exit node
> is changed.
To be on the safe side, I'll assume the underlying unproven assumption
(that "tails_htp"'s fingerprint is that easily recognizable by an exit
node) is true, which is probably the case in the current state
> Proposed solution: use stream isolation, run tails_htp/wget over
> a different SocksPort.
Great idea, thanks!
I've added it to this ticket:
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